

## **Ministerial Statement**

**By Hon Patrick Conlon MP**

**Minister for Emergency Services**

Today I have released the report of the review of emergency services, in particular the CFS, MFS and SES.

This was a review undertaken for the Government by John Dawkins, Stephen Baker and Richard McKay. The findings and recommendations are theirs, not the Government's.

As a Minister I did give my views to the review on certain matters important to me. I stressed that I believe any new arrangements should preserve the distinct identities of each of the emergency service agencies, and that the agencies should be supportive of proposed changes.

The most important people in the process are the people who deliver our invaluable emergency services, whether volunteer or paid.

I believe the review has been consistent with this fundamental tenet.

I understand that the review's recommendations have drawn in substantial part from a joint submission from the CFS and MFS to the review.

The mere fact that the MFS and CFS were able to make a joint submission has been a great step forward.

The Government will make its response to the review in approximately four weeks time. I am hopeful that the bulk of the review can be adopted.

This will depend to a great degree on the reception given the report by the emergency agencies themselves. I am strongly of the view that it is counter productive to try to force unwelcome reform on our vital emergency services. It is also unwise to try and fool them in a reform process. This process will deliver the best outcomes to the people of this

State who rely on our emergency services if change is understood by the agencies and embraced.

Not everyone, of course, will agree on everything but I am hopeful of sufficient agreement to take us forward.

I am certain that the deep commitment of emergency service workers and volunteers to their services will allow us to find the way forward.

The report in brief suggests the abandonment of the failed ESAU experiment and the creation of a fire and rescue commission. It suggests a closer coordination of services, that will produce efficiencies and administration savings.

The first response that I can indicate is that any savings created by reform will stay with emergency services, to improve our delivery of service on the fire or rescue ground. This has been the Government's objective throughout.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Task force for its work. John Dawkins, Stephen Baker and Dick Mackay have worked hard to produce this comprehensive, thoughtful and constructive report.

I would also like to thank those individuals and organisations who have made submissions to the Review. I believe it is a sign of the dedication of those involved in Emergency Services that the Task Force had substantial body of material to consider.

Lastly, but certainly not least, I thank the heads of the Emergency Service organisations for their support for the Review. I would also like to make special mention of Mr Barry Apsey at this stage. As the Chief Executive of the Emergency Services Administration his assistance to the Review has been invaluable. The constructive and helpful approach of he and his staff has been an asset to the Review. I note that his generous contribution has been of great benefit to the Emergency Services in this state.

Mr Speaker – I table the report.

# **EMERGENCY SERVICES REVIEW**

## **REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE**

**The Hon John Dawkins AO**

**The Hon Stephen Baker**

**Mr Richard McKay**

**13 May 2003**

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

- 1 The review was established by the Minister of Emergency Services in October 2002 to:
  - Review the current governance arrangements of Emergency Services
  - Determine the best way to support the operational focus of the Emergency Services
  - Ensure that the Government's priority of providing the highest possible level of resources to support the efforts of volunteers and staff attending fire and emergency incidents can be achieved.
- 2 In recommending a revised structure for the emergency services sector the task force has taken into account the following guiding objectives:
  - community safety needs to be the primary concern of all in the sector (with activities to be aligned to the Prevention, Preparedness, Response, Recovery model)
  - volunteerism is critical to community safety
  - the separate identities of MFS, CFS and SES must be retained
  - there must be an improved capacity and willingness to work together for the common good
  - governance generally and accountability specifically must be enhanced
  - there needs to be a capacity for setting priorities between the various services
  - the structure must be manageable
  - legislative anomalies need to be removed
  - duplicated activities and boundaries disputes must be minimised
  - local government needs to be re-engaged wherever possible
  - there needs to be a clear emphasis on maintaining service delivery in country areas
  - building on the joint proposal by the MFS and CFS is a key to success
  - the Government needs to be assured that the considerable resources are being applied efficiently and effectively.

## **3 CONCLUSIONS**

### **General**

- The current structure of the emergency services sector is complex, confused and unclear.
- The relationships, reporting arrangements and accountabilities that exist between organisations and the Minister, and amongst the organisations themselves, are confusing and difficult to understand.
- The current method of allocating resources lacks rigour and consistency, in that there is no single body or person, other than the Minister, with a government-wide perspective.

- The almost unanimous perception of stakeholders is that the current hybrid governance model is not working. The task force supports this view.

### Reviews

- There appears to have been little action resulting from a range of reviews (see Appendix G) that delivered on the performance of emergency services in this State, starting with Ash Wednesday report in 1983.. The sector has been much reviewed and little reformed. There appears to be limited accountability in the emergency services sector. Many of the recommendations from previous reviews remain relevant and valid.
- The over-riding observation that arises from a study of these reports is that agency accountability to the executive (government) and to the people through their elected representatives is a live issue.

### Current Structure

- The task force recognises that both volunteers and career officers are critical to the provision of emergency services. The interest of both groups must be promoted and protected during any reform process.
- Both career officers and volunteers have needs that must be addressed by management, such as training, equipment, promotional opportunities and health and safety.
- Particular challenges exist in relation to the aging volunteer force and gender balance in all three services.
- Enhanced involvement of local government is essential for effective emergency management and response. There is merit in re-establishing the linkages that existed prior to the levy being introduced.
- There is widespread dissatisfaction amongst the staff and volunteers with the way non-operational functions are currently performed. ESAU, through no fault of the management or staff, has little credibility or support amongst MFS, CFS and SES.
- Regardless of who is right and who is wrong (and each side has legitimate grievances), the current ESAU arrangement is not satisfactory for any of the parties, including ESAU.
- The situation has deteriorated to the extent that transformational change is essential.
- there is little evidence to suggest that the current governance arrangements and management have optimised efficiencies
- the strategic approach to policy and service delivery that was envisaged has not eventuated

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## 4 RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. The South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission (SAFESC) be created. A suggested organisation chart is shown in Appendix H.
2. All the strategic and organisational responsibilities of the MFS, CFS Board and the SES be transferred to the Commission.
3. A Charter be developed which encapsulates the responsibilities of the Commission.
4. The Commission be given responsibility for developing and maintaining equitable risk-based processes for resolving and reviewing geographic boundary issues.
5. The MFS, CFS and SES have their own operations capabilities and be recognised with their own legislation. The existing legislation should be revised to reflect that these entities be responsible to the Commission rather than the Minister and each have capability for their own response, planning and logistics and public announcement functions. The legislation covering the fire services should be consistent to the extent that it is practicable.
6. The MFS, CFS and SES each be headed by a Chief Officer. MFS and CFS responsible to the Commission, SES to the Chair (see Recommendation 12).
7. The position of Chief Executive Officer of the CFS be abolished.
8. The Commission have three voting members - the Chair and the Chief Officers of MFS and CFS - and two non-voting members. This structure provides high level access to the Commission by each of the three emergency service providers, with the SES reporting through the Chair.
9. Decisions of the Commission be made by a majority vote, provided the Chair's vote is part of the majority.
10. ESAU be disbanded and relevant functions transferred to the Commission. Where appropriate some of these functions may be transferred to the Justice Portfolio shared services unit.
11. Given the magnitude of the task in establishing the Commission and the necessary basis of cooperation between the MFS, CFS and SES, that a small team be appointed to manage the establishment of the Commission. . It would also provide strategic and policy support to the Commission. The head of this Strategic Services Unit should be appointed by the Chair, with responsibility to the Chair.
12. The Chair's responsibilities include the provision of policy support to the Government, emergency management support to the peak Emergency Management body and overall management of the SES.
13. The need for strategic and policy support to Government be recognised by having sufficient resources within the Commission to support the State's emergency management functions – such as inter-agency, state and national initiatives. This unit would provide the support needed to implement the outcomes of the current review of the State's disaster legislation and associated arrangements. These resources should be located in the Strategic Services Unit (as described in Recommendation 11).
14. An Operations Support Division be created and headed by a Director. The Director's responsibilities should include provision of specified support functions to MFS, CFS and SES, with formal accountabilities to those organisations and to the Commission. Some of the support functions could be performed from elsewhere in the Justice Portfolio.



- 15 The Director, Operations Support would be a non-voting member of the Commission.
- 16 In order to ensure proper linkages to the Justice Portfolio, a nominee of the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Justice be a non-voting member of the Commission.
- 17 The CFS Board to be restructured as the Country Fire and Rescue Board. It should focus on advising the Minister, CFS and SES on issues concerning public safety in regional areas, including volunteer issues, re-building local government involvement in the delivery of fire and rescue services and rationalisation of facilities where appropriate. The Board would advise the Chief Officer on fire prevention and fire suppression matters of a strategic or policy nature.

### **Emergency Management Recommendations**

It is recommended that:

- 18 The Government clearly state its expectations (outcomes) of the emergency services sector.
- 19 The sector adopt the Commonwealth framework – Prevention, Preparedness, Response, Recovery

### **Resource Allocation within the Sector Recommendations**

It is recommended that:

- 20 The Minister for Emergency Services retain control of the allocation of funds through the Community Emergency Services Fund.
- 21 Funding bids from MFS, CFS, SES and other service providers be prioritised by SAFESC for consideration by the Minister.
- 22 Responsibility for administration of the Community Emergency Services Fund be transferred to SAFESC.

### **Local Government Recommendations**

It is recommended that:

- 23 Discussions be undertaken with the Local Government Association to assess the feasibility of the LGA taking over collection of the property levy.
- 24 Savings be pursued through the use of local government resources in a range of activities, on a fee for service basis.

### **Efficiency and Savings Recommendations**

It is recommended that:

- 25 Opportunities for improved efficiency and savings be pursued. For example:
  - training - MFS and CFS each operate and maintain their own training facilities, causing duplication in administration, curriculum design, maintenance of standards and national accreditation as well as facilities costs
  - stations - in regional SA there are 43 instances of CFS and SES stations in the same vicinity and 10 instances of CFS, MFS and SES having stations within 10 kilometres of each other

- accommodation - whilst there has been some rationalisation with ESAU, SES and CFS located in the one building, it must be asked whether they need to be in the CBD
- shared services - whilst the task force has recommended that shared services be provided from within the Commission, there could be economies of scale if some of the shared services currently being provided by ESAU were to be provided by the Justice Portfolio shared service infrastructure

- 26 Opportunities for Commonwealth funding for appropriate emergency management activities be investigated and pursued.

Conservatively the task force estimates savings of at least 2% (\$2.4m) per annum, in the third year of implementation.

Establishment of the Commission and an emergency management capability, plus implementation costs, will defer savings. The Commission should be allowed to redirect savings to meet emerging priorities, such as re-investing in emergency management infrastructure and activities, especially in regional areas where facilities, vehicles and equipment need attention.

It is recommended that:

- 27 All savings in the first year after implementation of savings initiatives be re-invested in the sector.
- 28 Savings targets be set at 1% (\$1.2m) for the second year and a further 1% for the third year - bring the total savings target to \$2.4m.

### **Post -Implementation Review Recommendations**

- 29 The task force recommends that, within two years of implementation, the Minister review progress and performance.

## **1 INTRODUCTION**

The Minister for Emergency Services announced in Parliament on 17 October 2002, an inquiry into South Australia's emergency services. The Minister outlined the objective of the review as:

*'to examine and identify improvements to the management, administration and governance arrangements for emergency services in relation to the following organisations:*

- *Country Fire Services [CFS]*
- *State Emergency Services [SES]*
- *South Australian Metropolitan Fire Services [MFS]*
- *Emergency Services Administrative Unit [ESAU]*

On 18 October 2002 the Premier announced a review of state disaster legislation and associated arrangements. The two reviews are quite separate but need to complement each other in order to avoid duplication and inconsistencies and to provide compatible recommendations.

The Auditor-General, at the request of the Treasurer, is currently examining 'the administration of the Emergency Services budget over the four years ended 30 June 2002, with particular emphasis on the management of the CFS budget .....'. The Emergency Services review is not to address financial management issues that would most likely be covered by the Auditor-General.

This report summarises the findings of the Emergency Services Review task force and recommendations for improvement.

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## **2 TERMS OF REFERENCE**

### **2.1 PARAMETERS OF THE REVIEW**

The terms of reference (Appendix A) instruct the task force to examine and report on:

- 1 *'whether the key strategic priorities announced in October 1998 to achieve better public safety outcomes continue to be appropriate*
- 2 *the extent to which current governance arrangements (since the creation of ESAU) have met the above stated expectations; (including the role and function of the Emergency Services Leadership Group)*
- 3 *the extent to which current governance arrangements and management have optimised efficiencies through a strategic approach to policy and service delivery across emergency services*
- 4 *the adequacy of current arrangements to meet the non-operational requirements of SAMFS, CFS and SES*
- 5 *recommendations for the enhancement of arrangements to improve efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery, including the most appropriate methods of resource allocation within the sector.'*

The Review is not to address the adequacy of funding or the operations of the various Emergency Service Organisations (ESOs).

The South Australian Ambulance Service is excluded from the Review.

It is emphasised that the Review is neither an efficiency nor a financial audit. It is primarily an examination of governance arrangements.

### **2.2 THE REVIEW TEAM**

The task force members are:

- the Hon John Dawkins AO (Chair)
- the Hon Stephen Baker
- Mr Richard McKay

The task force will report to the Minister for Emergency Services, through the Chief Executive of the Department of Justice.

### **2.3 DEFINING GOVERNANCE**

The Terms of Reference refer to 'management, administration and governance arrangements'. The meaning of management and administration would be well known and requires no elaboration or explanation. The same cannot be said for 'governance'.

The task force adopts the view that governance is a set of elements that, when existing together, establish accountability for the activities of an organisation. In the words of the Commonwealth Auditor-General, Mr Pat Barrett<sup>1</sup> good governance requires all relevant people to:

- *'identify and articulate their responsibilities and their relationships*
- *determine who is responsible for what, to whom and by when'.*

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<sup>1</sup> Barrett P, Commonwealth Auditor-General, Risk Odyssey Conference 24 May 2002, Adelaide

Mr Barrett believes that, even more important than the definition of governance, it is critical that the elements of good governance exist and that they are well integrated. He suggests that the elements of good governance include:

- *identification of stakeholders*
- *specified outcomes required by the various stakeholders*
- *corporate objectives and strategies*
- *corporate business planning*
- *audit committees*
- *control structures*
- *risk management*
- *agency values and codes of ethics*
- *performance information and standards*
- *evaluation and review*
- *a focus on client service.*

It is Mr Barrett's view that, although it is relatively easy to define the elements, the real challenge for related organisations is to:

*'ensure that all the elements of good corporate governance are effectively integrated into a coherent corporate approach by individual organisations and are well understood and applied throughout those organisations'.*

The task force considers this need for an integrated approach is particularly relevant in the emergency services sector. The extent to which it exists is examined throughout this report.

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### **3 CONDUCT OF THE REVIEW**

Research consisted mainly of consultation with stakeholders and analysis of published and unpublished documents.

Those consulted (see Appendix B) included:

- specific organisations nominated in the terms of reference
- other individuals and organisations involved in or affected by the delivery of emergency services
- Department of Emergency Services (Queensland)
- Fire and Emergency Services Authority (Western Australia)

Several submissions were received as a result of a public invitation (The Advertiser, 2 November 2002, Appendix C).

The Review Group examined a range of reports that had been delivered on the performance of emergency services in this State (Appendix G). They considered the extent to which identified faults and deficiencies had been addressed.

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## 4 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS.

### 4.1 1998 STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

In October 1998 strategic priorities were announced for Emergency Services to achieve better public safety outcomes.

The strategic priorities announced were to:

- *introduce a more appropriate and equitable funding system ensuring adequate funding for emergency services in South Australia*
- *introduce a strategic framework for the allocation and management of resources*
- *adopt a strategic approach to the provision of emergency services in South Australia*
- *ensure adequate emergency services are provided in regional South Australia*
- *achieve more cost effective delivery of emergency services*
- *better support the role of volunteers in emergency services*
- *improve the telecommunications facilities for emergency services and police.*

#### **Status**

A number of changes have been implemented as a result of these priorities mostly in the areas of funding and organisational arrangements. These are explained below

#### **4.1.1 Conclusions**

The strategic priorities announced in 1998, aimed at achieving better public safety outcomes, are still appropriate.

#### **4.1.2 Emergency Services Levy**

Until 1998, local government had supplied services, buildings, uniforms and equipment to CFS and SES at a value that has not been formally quantified (estimated to have been in the order of \$8 million per annum).

The Emergency Services Levy was introduced in 1998. The levy was raised on land and mobile property, collected by Revenue SA and allocated to emergency service providers. It replaced the previous method of raising funds through contributions from insurers.

The Government granted remissions to the extent that the levy has raised only approximately 50% of the funds needed.

The funds raised by the levy, as well as a Government contribution to cover the remissions, are deposited to the Community Emergency Services Fund (established by Section 28 of the Emergency Services Funding Act). In 2002/03 receipts to the Fund are estimated to be:

Contributions from Property Owners:

Fixed Property	
Government	2.1m
Private (including local government)	50.5m
Mobile Property	26.3m
Remissions	68.4m
Pensioner Concessions	6.1m
Interest and Certificate Sales	0.5m
Total Receipts	153.9m

A further \$2.1m will be provided through appropriation for capital works related to communications, bringing the total receipts to \$156.0m.

In 2002/03 funds are to be distributed as:

Emergency Services Organisations	120.0m
Levy collection	7.6m
Other expenses and projects	31.1m *
 Total expenditure budget	 158.7m
(* including Police, Surf lifesavers, etc)	

The Fund is managed by an officer in the Justice Portfolio who reports to the Minister for Emergency Services. The Fund Manager, on behalf of the Minister, negotiates directly with the Chief Officer of MFS, Chief Executive Officer of CFS, State Director of SES and, to a lesser extent, the Chief Executive of ESAU.

Since the introduction of the Emergency Services Levy, local government has withdrawn funding and services of the order of \$8m per annum. This now has to be funded from the Community Emergency Services Fund.

#### **4.1.3 Organisational Arrangements**

The other significant change was the creation of the Emergency Services Administrative Unit (ESAU). It was formed as a result of the 1998 Cabinet Submission mentioned in the Terms of Reference, taking effect from 1 July 1999.

The intention was to remove non-operational functions from the MFS, CFS and SES and to achieve strategic and efficiency benefits by grouping together under one management and in one location, the non-operational functions and employees.

In stage 1 of the new structure, ESAU was to provide strategic, corporate and support services to the MFS, CFS and SES, all of which would continue to operate under their existing legislation. In stage 2, ESAU was to take over policy services and strategic management, with legislative changes to facilitate MFS and CFS joining SES as divisions of ESAU.

##### **Status**

Changes in Government direction prevented the completion of stage 1 and stage 2 was not commenced. This left a complex, confused structure and organisational arrangements described in Section 4.2.

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## **4.2 ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS**

### **4.2.1 Current Environment**

The Emergency Services Administrative Unit was formed in July 1999. The intention was to remove non-operational functions from the MFS, CFS and SES and to achieve strategic and efficiency benefits by grouping together under one management and in one location, the non-operational functions and employees.

Changes in Government direction prevented the completion of stage 1 where ESAU was to provide strategic, corporate and support services to the MFS, CFS and SES, all of which would continue to operate under their existing legislation.

Stage 2, where ESAU was to take over policy services and strategic management, with legislative changes to facilitate MFS and CFS joining SES as divisions of ESAU, was not commenced.

Current arrangements are documented below. The current reporting structure is shown in Appendix F.

#### **South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service (MFS)**

The MFS is a corporation formed under its own legislation, the South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service Act, which stipulates that the Minister for Emergency Services is the corporation.

The Chief Officer carries out policies and implements decisions of the corporation, administers the business of the corporation, controls the fire brigades and carries out responsibilities assigned by the corporation.

Employees are engaged under the Metropolitan Fire Service Act.

The MFS has 18 fire stations throughout most of greater metropolitan Adelaide and 17 stations in regional cities and towns, some of the towns being quite small.

In 2001/02 the MFS operating expenditure was \$66.8m and capital expenditure was \$5.1m; a total of \$71.9m. There were 770 career employees and 207 retained volunteers.

#### **Country Fire Service (CFS)**

The CFS is a body corporate with its own legislation, the Country Fires Act. It is managed by a Board which has responsibility for the administration and control of the CFS. The Minister can direct the Board only by invoking the provisions of the Public Corporations Act; this requires regulations, which need to be tabled in Parliament.

The role of the Chief Executive Officer is related to management and administration of the CFS while the Chief Officer is 'ultimately responsible for CFS operations'.

The Board sees as one of its main roles, the promotion and protection of the interests of volunteers.

Employees are engaged under the Country Fires Act.

The CFS has 430 brigades covering most of South Australia. In some areas significant housing and industrial development has meant that the CFS covers built up areas, for example in the northern and southern suburbs and in the Adelaide Hills. Torrens Island is in a CFS zone. Changes to fire district boundaries require CFS Board approval.

In 2001/02 the CFS operating expenditure was \$30.5m and capital expenditure was \$7.6m; a total of \$38.1m. There were 71 career employees and 16,500 volunteers.

**Emergency Services Administrative Unit (ESAU)**

ESAU is an administrative unit under the Public Sector Management Act; it does not have its own organisation-specific legislation.

The Chief Executive of ESAU is responsible to the Minister for Emergency Services, but reports to the Chief Executive of the Justice Portfolio who acts under delegations from the Minister.

Employees are engaged under the Public Sector Management Act.

ESAU was formed in July 1999 to provide strategic and support services to the MFS, CFS and SES. For various reasons outside its control, ESAU's role was restricted to that of support services provider.

In 2001/02 ESAU's operating expenditure was \$9.8m. Of this \$9.6 was recharged to the MFS, CFS and SES. There were 108 career employees.

**State Emergency Services (SES)**

The SES is a division of ESAU, reporting to the Chief Executive of ESAU, but on operational matters the Director reports directly to the Minister. The Director has specific responsibilities under the State Emergency Service Act for operational matters, including the creation of SES units and appointment of emergency officers.

It is the Chief Executive of ESAU who reports annually to the Minister on the administration of the Act.

Employees are engaged under the Public Sector Management Act.

The SES has 65 units and 6 Sea Rescue squadrons throughout metropolitan and regional South Australia.

In 2001/02 the SES operating expenditure was \$6.7m and capital expenditure was \$1.6m; a total of \$8.3m. There were 31 career employees and 6,600 volunteers.

Summaries of operating costs for the years 1996/97 to 2001/02 and employees and volunteers from 1999 to 2002 are shown in Appendix E.

**4.2.2 Conclusions**

The current structure of the emergency services sector is complex, confused and unclear.

The relationships, reporting arrangements and accountabilities that exist between organisations and the Minister, and amongst the organisations themselves, are confusing and difficult to understand.

The non-completion of the plans for ESAU has left the organisational arrangements and structure complex and confused.

The Chief Executive of ESAU has been prevented from taking on the full range of duties that were expected of the position. In addition, the Chief Executive is unable to manage the operational activities of the SES, which is a division of ESAU.

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## 4.3 FUNDING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION WITHIN THE SECTOR

### 4.3.1 Current Environment

#### Process and Responsibilities

The funding process can be summarised as:

- The Treasurer, as Minister responsible for the Emergency Services Funding Act, and the Minister for Emergency Services, determine the amount needed to fund emergency services (\$156.0m in 2002/03)
- The Treasurer determines:
  - the amount to be raised via the Emergency Service Levy (\$153.9m)
  - the rate of levy necessary to raise the funds
  - the rate and amount to be charged to fixed and mobile property owners (\$78.9m)
  - the value of pensioner concessions (\$6.1m)
  - the value of interest (\$0.5m)
  - the necessary government subsidy, through remissions (\$68.4m).
- The Minister, under delegation from the Treasurer, determines the distribution of funds to emergency service providers and to cover administration of the Act and collection of the levy.

#### Accountabilities and Negotiations

The Minister negotiates directly with the Chief Officer of MFS, the Chief Executive Officer of CFS and the Director of SES, in relation to budget allocation.

The Chief Executive of ESAU, as with all chief executives of the Justice Portfolio, reports to the Chief Executive of the Department of Justice in relation to funds that are provided to ESAU for specified services and also as manager of the financial arm of the Emergency Service Organisations (ESOs).

The previous Minister decided that funds were to be allocated to the ESOs, and that they would pay ESAU for services provided.

The Fund Manager provides financial advice and support to the Minister and various executives, but does not set policy. The Fund Manager has significant financial delegations, but only for payments related to programs that have already been approved by the Minister.

The Fund Manager sometimes negotiates on behalf of the Minister, but subject to the Minister's ratification.

#### Status

There has been considerable concern amongst the ESOs and ESAU about whether funds can be channelled through ESAU for the services provided by ESAU. Legal advice is that the Fund can make payments either to ESAU or the ESOs, for strategic and other ESO support.

While MFS and CFS exist as separate organisations, there is an accounting/accountability argument that transparency is enhanced if these organisations purchase their support by way of service level agreements.

The process of directing both the levy and the Government contribution through the Fund appears cumbersome but it has the advantage of giving the Minister control of the total

amount to be allocated. The alternative of having the State's contribution processed through normal departmental budget processes may cloud budget responsibilities.

#### **4.3.2 Conclusions**

The current method of allocating resources lacks rigour and consistency, in that there is no single body or person, other than the Minister, with a government-wide perspective.

The Minister frequently is involved in issues that should be resolved within an authorised line management structure.

Directing both the levy and the Government contribution through the Community Emergency Services Fund is cumbersome but it has the advantage of giving the Minister control of the total amount to be allocated.

The process of individual agencies dealing directly with the Fund Manager is less than ideal. There is no clear responsibility to identify and resolve strategic issues and priorities. There is no evidence that bids are reviewed to ensure that they meet sector-wide needs/priorities before consideration by the Minister.

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## 4.4 GOVERNANCE

### 4.4.1 Current Environment

At present there is very little by way of government-wide governance. Clearly the Minister of Emergency Services is accountable to Parliament for the State's emergency services but the only pieces of legislation that attempt to address cross-agency issues in this field are the State Disaster Act and the Emergency Services Funding Act. Neither addresses strategic or policy issues related to emergency services other than disasters.

In order to manage the implementation of the strategic priorities articulated in 1998, the Minister has to resort to the legislation covering each of the ESOs – MFS, CFS and SES.

#### **State Disaster Act**

The State Disaster Act covers disasters or major emergencies and is the subject of the previously mentioned separate review. In its present form it has a very narrow focus; it does not cover emergency services generally.

#### **The Emergency Services Funding Act**

The Emergency Services Funding Act addresses funding for emergency services, both in terms of raising funds through the Emergency Services Levy and expenditure through the Community Emergency Services Fund. The Act authorises the Minister to apply funds for the provision of emergency services.

#### **Status**

The over-riding effect of the legislation is that:

- The current legislation covers the suppression and prevention of fires and protection of life and property threatened by other emergencies, but does not emphasise such roles as state and national disaster planning, emergency management and policy development.
- The four organisations involved in emergency services each have different governance, management and administration arrangements.

### 4.4.2 Conclusions

Clearly the Government's expectations have not been met. The almost unanimous perception of stakeholders is that the current hybrid governance model is not working. The task force supports this view.

The achievement of better public safety and compliance with national emergency management requirements are dependent on the application of sound governance principles across the emergency services sector.

The different governance, management and administration arrangements of the four organisations involved in emergency services causes confusion, inefficiency and inadequate accountability.

Because the current legislation relates to individual organisations there is limited integration in the legislation. The elements of good governance mentioned in Section 2.3 might exist to varying degrees in the four organisations but there is little to link them in a meaningful related governance model.

Whilst the Minister for Emergency Services is accountable to Parliament for the State's emergency services, the current legislative and structural support for the Minister is not helpful. The Minister's responsibility is daunting, given the complexity and inconsistency of the legislation that established and controls the various organisations.

The view of the task force is that legislation needs to be introduced that recognises emergency management in the broader sense.

It is particularly important that the elements of good governance are integrated within and across MFS, CFS and SES rather than having each organisation operating under separate and different governance. The services provided by MFS, CFS and SES are components of the emergency management sector and need to be recognised as such.

The Country Fires Act needs a major overhaul in order for the Minister to have more influence over CFS activities; currently it is difficult for the Minister to exercise control.

The CFS Board has outlived its usefulness in its current form. In fact its existence has been one of the obstacles to change. The MFS has operated without a Board for many years.

While the management responsibilities of the Board need to be removed, there are other responsibilities that should be enhanced, particularly in respect of representing volunteers, promoting volunteerism, coordinating with local government and rationalisation of fire and rescue services in regional areas. The Board will continue to advise the Minister and work with the management of the CFS, MFS and SES, to improve public safety.

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## 4.5 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT REVIEWS

The review team examined a range of reports (see Appendix G) that had been delivered on the performance of emergency services in this State, starting with the Ash Wednesday report in 1983. Of special interest was the extent to which identified faults and deficiencies were actioned by each of the agencies. Brief comments have been made below on five of the reports which have some relevance to this review.

### 4.5.1 Findings Relevant to this Review

#### **Report of the Review Team on the South Australian Bushfires, October 1983**

In this report (paragraph 4.3 under the section entitled 'The Operation of the State Disaster Plan'), the following conclusion was drawn:

*'One of the greatest weaknesses in the counter disaster operations of Ash Wednesday was the lack of a unified fire service. The State Controller (Fire) under the State Disaster Plan is the Chief Officer of the South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service and theoretically as State Controller he has control of the Metropolitan Fire Service and the Country Fire Service at a time of a declared disaster. In fact, on the day of the disaster the control of the CFS was not available to him and fire fighting in the Adelaide Hills where MFS and CFS had adjoining and overlapping regions could not be properly coordinated. There is no doubt that the State's Fire Services should be integrated.'*

In pursuing such integration, the report drew attention to the need for Government to preserve the volunteer structure of the CFS as it is 'critical to the State's fire fighting capacity'.

Additional advantages mentioned were 'rationalisation and amalgamation, particularly in some regional cities, and of integrated training'.

In relation to the SES, the report concluded that the service was grossly under-utilised.

*'The events of Ash Wednesday were frustrating for the little used volunteers of the SES, whose expertise is wide and varied and undoubtedly should have been used to advantage on that day. This underlines the need for better cooperation'.*

#### **Status**

Despite improvements in cooperation and coordination over the last 20 years, deficiencies identified in the Ash Wednesday report remain.

#### **Thirty-Fourth Report of the Public Accounts Committee on the Cost and Operations of the Country Fire Services (tabled in the House of Assembly 11 September 1984)**

The report was critical of the performance of the Board in acquitting its duties under the Country Fires Act, particularly in relation to financial control, management and operations.

There had been six other investigations instigated into the financial difficulties of the CFS in the two years preceding the Public Accounts Committee report.

#### **Status**

While significant steps were taken in 1983 to fix the problems identified in the CFS, deficiencies in record keeping noted by ESAU and the most recent budget overrun (being investigated by the Auditor-General), would bring into question the suitability of current (and previous) governance arrangements.

#### **Report of the Review Working Party on the South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service Country Brigades Staffing Strategy and Associated Standards of Fire Cover (1993)**

This report was produced for the Minister of Emergency Services in December 1993. It examined the level of support provided by the MFS to a range of country towns and cities.

Where requested by local authorities, the report recommended a joint examination of district fire boundaries by MFS and CFS.

This supported the endorsed agreement of April 1992 between the Chief Executive Officers of the CFS and MFS to examine the applicability of MFS presence in the towns of Burra, Kadina, Kapunda, Moonta, Peterborough and Wallaroo.

**Status**

Almost a decade later, district fire boundaries remain unaltered. Despite many examples of inappropriate fire district boundaries, and a number of attempts to resolve them, necessary reform is, and will continue to be frustrated without new workable arrangements that enforce resolution of this issue.

**Report of the Select Committee on Bush Fire Protection and Suppression Measures (dated May 1993, presented to the House of Assembly)**

The report contained 64 recommendations to enhance protection from and suppression of bushfires. What is not clear is the extent to which the report was embraced by the responsible authorities and action taken on the recommendations.

There is no summary available to determine whether the deliberations of the Parliament have made any material difference to the operations of the CFS and its army of volunteers, or to building a safer community.

**Status**

It is obvious that a number of recommendations have been rejected/ignored.

Whilst most of the recommendations are of an operational nature and therefore out of scope for this review, the task force is concerned that there appears to be no evidence of the report having even been addressed, let alone actioned.

**Tulka Fire – Internal Audit of Mutual Aid (April 2001)**

The report was prepared by the Government Investigations Unit of the Crown Solicitor's Office, following a review of planning and mutual aid procedures related to the fire at Tulka, near Port Lincoln in February 2001.

Conclusions drawn in the report included:

- that the CFS failed to accept an offer of help from the MFS
- that there was insufficient planning and deployment of resources
- that there was a lack of direct liaison between the two services
- that MFS resources were under deployed.

Recommendations included:

- that Senior management of CFS and MFS need to lead by example in promoting the use of the agreed Mutual Aid Policy
- that liaison between CFS and MFS needs to be promoted, making it less 'optional'
- that cultural differences between MFS and CFS need to be addressed urgently.

#### **4.5.2 Conclusions**

The over-riding observation that arises from a study of these reports is that agency accountability to the executive (government) and to the people through their elected representatives is a live issue.



Several reviews over the past 20 years have recommended significant changes to the way emergency services are structured and managed, including:

- integration of the MFS and CFS
- better cooperation between the fire services and SES
- rationalisation of services in regional centres
- reviewing geographical boundaries.

There appears to have been little action resulting from the reviews. The sector has been much reviewed and little reformed. While separate organisations exist under separate legislation there will always be difficulty in gaining commitment to resolving boundary and demarcation issues.

There appears to be limited accountability in the emergency services sector.

Many of the recommendations from previous reviews remain relevant and valid.

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## **4.6 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT**

The review of state disaster legislation and associated arrangements that is being undertaken concurrently with the Emergency Services Review, has observed that the Commonwealth Government and other states have changed their approach to emergency management. It is now generally accepted that simply responding to disasters and emergencies is no longer appropriate. Closer links are being built into structures to ensure better coordination between policy development and strategic effort on the one hand, and operational activities on the other hand.

This change in attitude was gathering momentum during the 1990's and recent events such as the World Trade Centre and Bali incidents and the bushfires of the past two years in New South Wales, Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory, have further reinforced the need for a smarter approach.

Throughout Australia it is now accepted that public safety can best be enhanced through a holistic view of emergency management, comprising four main components - Prevention, Preparedness, Response, Recovery. The ESOs are almost entirely focused on response.

In Queensland and Western Australia specific resources have been positioned within the emergency services organisation to contribute to Commonwealth policy development, respond to Commonwealth requirements and access Commonwealth funds.

### **4.6.1 Current Environment**

Although some capability does exist within the ESOs and ESAU, there is a significant gap in the strategic and policy support being provided to the Government, eg:

- developing an integrated strategy for infrastructure protection
- follow-up work resulting from the COAG review of Natural Disaster Relief and Mitigation Arrangements
- prioritising resource allocation according to risk/need.

This is not a criticism of the organisations or their current leadership because the strategic role has neither been defined for, nor allocated to, any of the organisations. The legislation of the ESOs does not specify a strategic emergency management role and ESAU's strategic role was not developed, even though some of the skills needed do exist in ESAU.

Several ESAU staff and the ESOs are attempting to address the Government's strategic needs in an uncertain arrangement. As an example, ESAU's Chief Executive has taken the lead and spent considerable time on national and state emergency management work, even though there is nothing in ESAU's responsibilities or the Chief Executive's job specification to indicate that this function is expected.

The current review into the State's disaster legislation and associated arrangements is likely to identify that work in this area is increasing and resources need to be allocated to it. This could well be a reallocation of resources rather than additional resources.

### **4.6.2 Conclusions**

A significant gap exists in the provision of overall emergency management strategic and policy support to government, due largely to the inadequate institutional arrangements that have prevented the Government from defining its needs in this area. This has become more critical in the aftermath of recent terrorist attacks and the constant threat of bushfires.

The current separate review of state disaster legislation and associated arrangements is expected to reinforce this view.

It is essential that closer links between policy development and response activity are established and maintained. Resources are needed to ensure that Government receives appropriate policy support from response units and that response units act in accordance with policy.

Once these needs are defined, resources and an appropriate structure will be needed to provide support to the Government.

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## **4.7 THE EMERGENCY SERVICES LEADERSHIP GROUP**

### **4.7.1 Current Environment**

The Emergency Services Leadership Group comprises the heads of MFS, CFS, SES and ESAU.

The Leadership Group has existed, under at least three different names, for about three years. Neither its role nor its existence are recognised in legislation. It has no authority to develop or enforce policy or operational decisions. It was established to ensure a collaborative, strategic approach to the provision of emergency services to both the Government and the public, but, because of the lack of commitment to the model, has not succeeded in doing so.

The individual accountabilities and governance arrangements of the members appear to take priority over those of the Leadership Group and inter-agency issues. Neither ESAU nor any other party has the authority to insist on compliance with any agreements or understandings reached by this group.

Recently, in order to achieve more strategic, collaborative and effective outcomes, membership of the Emergency Services Leadership Group has been expanded to include the Chief Executive of the Justice Portfolio, the Commissioner for Police and the Chief Executive of the South Australian Ambulance Service.

### **4.7.2 Conclusions**

The Leadership Group does not provide an appropriate mechanism for achieving a satisfactory level of integration, accountability or strategic focus.

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## **4.8 THE ROLES OF VOLUNTEERS AND CAREER OFFICERS**

### **4.8.1 Current Environment**

During the review, the task force was informed of animosity that existed between the volunteers on the one hand, and career officers in MFS, CFS and SES on the other hand. Serving together on interstate bushfires has increased respect and understanding between the two groups.

Disputes over resources, geographic boundaries, publicity and positioning for preferential treatment have created ill feeling. It has at times been fuelled by comments from agencies' senior management and both volunteer and employee representative organisations.

Consistent with the national trend, the volunteer force in South Australia is ageing and in many areas numbers are declining. Some regional communities are having difficulty maintaining both SES and CFS services and it is common for individual volunteers to support both organisations.

Whilst there are now more women in the volunteer and paid workforce than previously, the MFS, CFS and SES all have a very large majority of males.

### **4.8.2 Conclusions**

The task force recognises that both volunteers and career officers are critical to the provision of emergency services. The interest of both groups must be promoted and protected during any reform process.

Volunteers bring community involvement and ownership that are vital to the successful protection of life and property. The State cannot afford the resources that would be needed if volunteers were not available.

Career officers are equally important, particularly in the metropolitan area where the level of risk and nature of emergencies are such that the skills and availability of a full-time fire fighting force are essential.

Both career officers and volunteers have needs that must be addressed by management, such as training, equipment, promotional opportunities and health and safety.

Particular challenges exist in relation to the aging volunteer force and gender balance in all three services.

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## **4.9 LOCAL GOVERNMENT**

As mentioned earlier in the report, introduction of the levy changed the way local government perceived its role in emergency management and the delivery of emergency services.

Prior to 1998, local councils had made a significant contribution through the provision of facilities such as fire stations, vehicles and plant, training and work rooms, equipment maintenance and storage, uniforms, consumables and administration assistance. Local councils were often the rally point around which community groups gathered in fund raising initiatives, thus providing another avenue for financial resources.

### **4.9.1 Current Environment**

Under the Commonwealth emergency management model of Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery, local government involvement is essential. The Commonwealth Government contributes 70% of salary costs for SES regional directors, whose role it is, in conjunction with local government, to prepare regional emergency management plans.

Local government is involved in mitigation works, intelligence and advice to government, fuel reduction (including property compliance) and fire breaks in fire risk areas, and membership of regional bushfire prevention committees and SES units. The CFS Board includes representation of local government.

Since the introduction of the levy, local councils have tended to transfer all their CFS and SES related costs to the State Government, for payment from the Community Emergency Services Fund.

The task force notes that in Western Australia the high level of involvement of local government has been retained. In that State councils will, from July 2003, collect the WA version of the levy and remit it to the State Government. It is believed that the unit cost of collection will be far less than in South Australia where it is collected by Revenue SA. Western Australian councils continue to apply annually to a Grants Committee for funding, in return entering into an agreement with the Government under which they will provide specified services.

In South Australia the Local Government Association recognises the need for local government to have a continuing role. In particular the LGA is willing to examine the feasibility of collecting the levy on behalf of Government.

### **4.9.2 Conclusions**

Enhanced involvement of local government is essential for effective emergency management and response. There is merit in re-establishing the linkages that existed prior to the levy being introduced.

The potential exists for local government to carry out work such as maintenance of facilities and equipment on behalf of the Government, on a fee for service basis. A closer working relationship between State and Local Government can only be beneficial to the provision of effective emergency services.

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## **4.10 GOVERNMENT RADIO NETWORK (GRN)**

### **4.10.1 Current Environment**

At present the GRN provides voice and data communications throughout the State, for use by government agencies. Continuing development and on-going provision of GRN services is managed by the Department of Administrative and Information Services.

It was brought to the task force's attention that several problems exist in the management and use of the GRN, such as an apparent lack of uniform radio procedures, lack of understanding of the GRN and its strengths and weaknesses and lack of an adequate disaster plan for the State

The suggestion was made to the task force that the State could suffer significantly in the case of a disaster because of the way the GRN is being used, and that there has not been a suitable trial of the system under simulated disaster conditions. These observations were brought to the attention of the Executive Director in DAIS who is responsible for the GRN.

### **4.10.2 Conclusions**

Problems exist in the management and use of the GRN and the system has not been sufficiently tested in a trial.

With the appointment of Mr J Hullick to review the performance of the GRN the task force did not pursue this matter.

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## **4.11 THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN AMBULANCE SERVICE**

### **4.11.1 Current Environment**

As mentioned earlier in the report the task force was instructed not to examine the South Australian Ambulance Service (SAAS) during the review.

The task force notes that SAAS exists under its own legislation, is part of the Justice Portfolio and is managed by a Board. It is funded by a mixture of consolidated revenue, ambulance subscriptions and fee for service. The Emergency Services Levy does not cover SAAS.

### **4.11.2 Conclusions**

Although the task force was directed to exclude SAAS from the review, several of those consulted about governance issues related to emergency services, suggested that it should be reviewed.

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## **4.12 NON-OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF MFS, CFS, SES**

The terms of reference ask whether the current arrangements meet the non-operational requirements of MFS, CFS and SES.

### **4.12.1 Current Environment**

Emergency services organisations have expressed dissatisfaction with certain of the services provided by ESAU. Finance, information technology, project management and procurement services appear to attract most criticism.

MFS and CFS also believe that having to resource ESAU has left them without sufficient capacity to provide input to policy development, respond to questions of a policy or strategic nature, prepare business cases and business plans, analyse performance and other non-operational matters. This belief remains even after several ESAU employees have been outposted to the ESOs. SES is less critical of the arrangements because it has always relied on a 'parent' organisation for corporate support. The task force was not convinced that these matters were receiving proper attention prior to the formation of ESAU.

There have been claims that MFS has to pay more for administrative support and that the cost of trucks has increased since the inception of ESAU. ESOs have expressed concern at delays in upgrading stations. An independent study, *the Betros Report*, concluded that there was no cost blow out in the establishment of new facilities under ESAU.

There is room for further gains by better managing the procurement and management of assets. Whilst ESAU's volunteer support program is widely acclaimed, the administrative load on volunteers is claimed to have increased, as has the time taken by ESAU for processing expense reimbursements. ESAU justifiably claims that, prior to its inception, record keeping in a range of areas was in poor shape. ESAU had to deal with many buildings, vehicles and equipment being in poor condition, particularly those of the CFS.

### **4.12.2 Conclusions**

There is widespread dissatisfaction amongst the staff and volunteers with the way non-operational functions are currently performed. ESAU, through no fault of the management or staff, has little credibility or support amongst MFS, CFS and SES.

The ESOs believe that their needs are not being met and they have no confidence in the current arrangements. No amount of persuasion or incremental improvement will change their attitude.

Regardless of who is right and who is wrong (and each side has legitimate grievances), the current ESAU arrangement is not satisfactory for any of the parties, including ESAU.

The objective of providing shared services had merit; however, for a range of reasons discussed elsewhere in the report, the current model has not succeeded, despite the best efforts of ESAU management.

The situation has deteriorated to the extent that transformational change is essential.

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## 4.13 EFFICIENCY AND SAVINGS

The task force is to assess the extent to which current governance arrangements and management have optimised efficiencies through a strategic approach to policy and service delivery across emergency services. It is necessary firstly to provide some context to the current arrangements by expanding on comments made above.

### 4.13.1 Background

#### The Creation of ESAU

In October 1998 it was envisaged that in stage 1, CFS and MFS would remain as separate entities and SES would become part of ESAU. ESAU would provide 'agreed strategic, corporate and support services' to the CFS and MFS.

It was envisaged in the Cabinet Submission that under stage 2, CFS and MFS would become divisions within ESAU, joining SES. The Chief Officers of CFS and MFS would be 'subject to the direction of the Chief Executive while retaining statutory powers necessary for the management of emergencies'. This model is common in South Australia, with several officers being responsible to a chief executive whilst having their own statutory powers.

A change in Government policy prevented ESAU from taking on the intended strategic role, limiting its role to the provision of corporate services. Consequently stage 1 was not achieved and a move to stage 2 was not commenced.

#### Status

The services to be provided by ESAU were not accurately defined, resulting in uncertainty and dispute, particularly in relation to strategy and policy advice.

It is not clear what mechanisms could be used for reaching agreement between all parties, especially when:

- neither the Chief Executive of ESAU nor the Minister can direct the CFS Board if agreement cannot be achieved
- the Chief Executive of ESAU cannot direct the Chief Officer of MFS
- the Director SES, a division of ESAU, has access to the Minister without involving the Chief Executive of ESAU.

ESAU was established to take a much wider role in strategic issues but it does not have the authority to do so. The ESOs consider that ESAU's role is already too wide. The Volunteer Fire Brigade's Association and the United Fire Fighters' Union agree with the ESOs.

#### Use of Resources

One way to assess whether the current arrangements have 'optimised efficiencies' is to examine the use of resources by the sector and the individual ESOs.

Over the six financial years from 1996/97 to 2001/02, recurrent expenditure, excluding the Government Radio Network, has increased from \$77.3 million to \$103.9 million - an increase of 34%. Capital outlay over that period has increased from \$4.5 million to \$14.4 million - an increase of 220%. Total annual expenditure (excluding GRN but including capital works) has thus increased from \$81.8 million to \$118.3 million - an increase of \$36.5 million (45%).

#### Status

It has been estimated that about \$8 million of the increase could have resulted from the cost shifting from local government that occurred after introduction of the Emergency Services Levy. A further \$12 million could be attributed to inflation. The remaining \$16 million

represents real increased expenditure. The financial results do not provide an accurate analysis of efficiency - but they certainly do not demonstrate savings.

#### **4.13.2 Current Environment**

Concentrating on the three years since ESAU commenced, total annual expenditure has increased by \$17.6 million (17.5%, well above the rate of inflation). This indicates that savings anticipated from the consolidation of strategic and support services have not been realised.

Over the same three year period the number of employees in the four organisations has increased from 883 to 973 (adjusted for abnormalities), an increase of 90 (10%). This reinforces the notion that savings have not been achieved.

##### **Value for Money**

The efficiency of services provided by ESAU needs to be considered. A recent benchmarking study appears to support the view that insufficient resources were being devoted to the HR, payroll, finance and IT functions. This is still the case. ESOs believe that these functions are not well performed by ESAU, but do not want to outlay further funds to ESAU in order to buy better service.

##### **Status**

The ESOs paid \$9.6 million to ESAU for support services in 2001/02, an increase of \$0.3 million since ESAU commenced. Even though the annual cost has reduced in real terms, MFS and CFS are dissatisfied with the services provided and its cost. They argue that they can provide their own support services cheaper and better than ESAU - but there is no evidence to support the claim.

##### **Efficiency and Savings Opportunities**

Indications are that efficiency gains and savings could be made in several functions, such as:

- training - MFS and CFS each operate and maintain their own training facilities, causing duplication in administration, curriculum design, maintenance of standards and national accreditation, as well as facilities-related expenses;
- stations - in regional SA there are 43 instances of CFS and SES stations in the same vicinity and ten instances of CFS, MFS and SES having stations within ten kilometres of each other;
- merging services - in those locations where the community is experiencing difficulty in maintaining two volunteer services it makes sense to combine CFS and SES operations;
- accommodation - whilst there has been some rationalisation with ESAU, SES and CFS located in the one building, it must be asked whether they need to be in the CBD. The same could be asked of the MFS corporate employees, although savings might be difficult to realise because the MFS building was purpose built.
- shared services - there could be economies of scale if the shared services currently being provided by ESAU were to be provided by the Justice Portfolio shared service infrastructure;
- fleet management - the task force understands that the Justice Business Review Unit has identified the potential for efficiency gains in the operations of the MFS fleet workshop and fleet management generally; these should be pursued;

- levy collection by local government - there is considerable savings potential if the levy on property could be collected by local Government as part of its normal operations, rather than maintaining a special collection process.

If major changes were made to the organisation and governance structures, as outlined in this document further significant savings could be made.

### **Revenue Opportunities**

In addition to these potential savings, there may be revenue opportunities.

The Queensland and Western Australian models support the view that savings are achievable. For example, in WA the small emergency management unit was instrumental in the Government securing Commonwealth funds for disaster mitigation. Experience in those jurisdictions indicates, however, that care should be taken to leave sufficient resources in the operating organisations to allow them to function effectively.

### **Calculating Savings**

The savings opportunities mentioned above have not been costed because to do so would require more resources and time than the task force has at its disposal. During the first year of implementation of savings strategies, establishment costs would limit the net benefit, but savings would accrue in following years.

In calculating the potential value of savings, recognition should be given to the time that will be needed to achieve the savings and the need to reinvest some of the savings in implementation effort and change management. In some cases investment will be needed prior to implementation. Placing pressure to achieve early savings could be harmful to the long term success of an improvement program.

The need to invest in resources for emergency management should also be borne in mind.

### **4.13.3 Conclusions**

The task force's conclusions on the issues of efficiency and savings can be summarised as:

- there is little evidence to suggest that the current governance arrangements and management have optimised efficiencies
- the strategic approach to policy and service delivery that was envisaged has not eventuated
- savings are unlikely to eventuate under a structure that depends on cooperation and collaboration, without authority and accountability
- further work is required to cost the savings initiatives that have been identified
- the shared service approach is relevant but, to operate effectively, each ESO requires internal capability in a range of areas.

There has been an increase of 90 employees (10%) over the 3 years since ESAU was formed.

Whilst there have been some improvements of note, the creation of ESAU has not brought about the efficiency gains that were intended. Reasons for the lack of success have included;

- absence of a clear explanation by the Government of ESAU's purpose
- reluctance of ESOs to accept the new arrangements
- inability of ESOs to effectively influence the quality and type of services delivered

- different cultures of MFS, CFS and SES preventing the formation of productive working relationships
- the perception that ESAU existed to control rather than support the operating arms of the sector.

Savings are potentially achievable through a major reorganisation and a concentrated effort to develop and drive an effective change process.

Savings may be slow to achieve in view of the necessary implementation time frame and re-investment requirements.

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## **5 CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING RECOMMENDATIONS**

The over-riding conclusion is that legislative and structural reform is critical in bringing about an appropriate level of emergency management capability and accountability in the emergency services sector.

### **5.1 STRUCTURAL OPTIONS**

The task force considered a number of options for structural reform:

- 1 The option of leaving ESAU in place and making incremental changes to the current arrangements is not viable because the key stakeholders have little confidence in the structure.
- 2 The option of reverting to the situation that existed prior to 1998 is also not tenable. The structures were fragmented then and there is no reason to expect that it would be any better now. Regardless of the best intentions of the individuals involved there are too many inconsistencies within the structure of the organisations, without an ability to achieve a strategic, cooperative approach.
- 3 The models of other jurisdictions have been suggested. Although none of the models in other states can be directly applied in South Australia, the task force found much to be commended in Western Australia and Queensland (Appendix D).
- 4 Creation of a government department, under the Public Sector Management Act, was considered. This would bring all functions, responsibilities and employees under the management of a Chief Executive, thereby creating one fire service.

The department structure would provide maximum flexibility for the Minister in budget allocation and strategic control but may be unacceptable to fire fighters, particularly the volunteers for whom bureaucratic control is unpalatable. This model is not preferred.

- 5 On the invitation of the task force, the MFS and CFS jointly proposed a structure that the task force considered in detail. The main features of the MFS/CFS model were:
  - MFS, CFS and SES to remain as separate organisations, with their existing legislation and governance arrangements, including the CFS Board
  - ESAU to be disbanded, with its functions being allocated to MFS and CFS
  - MFS and CFS to provide pre-determined support services for each other and for SES, e.g. MFS to provide capital works and procurement services for all ESOs and CFS to provide volunteer and risk management services
  - formation of a 2-person Commission (called South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission), with the Chief Officer of MFS and Chief Executive Officer of CFS being the joint Commissioners
  - a small team to provide state disaster and emergency management support, with an informal link to the Commission
  - an advisory 'forum' to advise the Minister, comprising representatives of the Minister, the Commission, local government, volunteers, employees and other stakeholders.

Under this model the role of the Commission would be mainly to resolve issues between the two services. The task force has further developed the proposal, as described in Structural and Governance Recommendations.

## 5.2 GUIDING OBJECTIVES

In recommending a revised structure for the emergency services sector the task force has taken into account the following guiding objectives:

- community safety needs to be the primary concern of all in the sector (with activities to be aligned to the Prevention, Preparedness, Response, Recovery model)
  - volunteerism is critical to community safety
  - the separate identities of MFS, CFS and SES must be retained
  - there must be an improved capacity and willingness to work together for the common good
  - governance generally and accountability specifically must be enhanced
  - there needs to be a capacity for setting priorities between the various services
  - the structure must be manageable
  - legislative anomalies need to be removed
  - duplicated activities and boundaries disputes must be minimised
  - local government needs to be re-engaged wherever possible
  - there needs to be a clear emphasis on maintaining service delivery in country areas
  - building on the joint proposal by the MFS and CFS is a key to success
  - the Government needs to be assured that the considerable resources are being applied efficiently and effectively.
-

## 6 **RECOMMENDATIONS**

### 6.1 **STRUCTURAL AND GOVERNANCE RECOMMENDATIONS**

**The task force recommends the following structure to facilitate accountability for effective and efficient emergency management and emergency services delivery.**

It is recommended that:

- 1 The South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission (SAFESC) be created. A suggested organisation chart is shown at Appendix H.
- 2 All the strategic and organisational responsibilities of the MFS, CFS Board and the SES be transferred to the Commission.
- 3 A Charter be developed which encapsulates the responsibilities of the Commission.
- 4 The Commission be given responsibility for developing and maintaining equitable risk-based processes for resolving and reviewing geographic boundary issues.
- 5 The MFS, CFS and SES have their own operations capabilities and be recognised with their own legislation. The existing legislation should be revised to reflect that these entities be responsible to the Commission rather than the Minister and each have capability for their own response, planning and logistics and public announcement functions. The legislation covering the fire services should be consistent to the extent that it is practicable.
- 6 The MFS, CFS and SES each be headed by a Chief Officer. MFS and CFS responsible to the Commission, SES to the Chair (see Recommendation 12).
- 7 The position of Chief Executive Officer of the CFS be abolished.
- 8 The Commission have three voting members - the Chair and the Chief Officers of MFS and CFS - and two non-voting members. This structure provides high level access to the Commission by each of the three emergency service providers, with the SES reporting through the Chair.
- 9 Decisions of the Commission be made by a majority vote, provided the Chair's vote is part of the majority.
- 10 ESAU be disbanded and relevant functions transferred to the Commission. Where appropriate some of these functions may be transferred to the Justice Portfolio shared services unit.
- 11 Given the magnitude of the task in establishing the Commission and the necessary basis of cooperation between the MFS, CFS and SES, that a small team be appointed to manage the establishment of the Commission. . It would also provide strategic and policy support to the Commission. The head of this Strategic Services Unit should be appointed by the Chair, with responsibility to the Chair.
- 12 The Chair's responsibilities include the provision of policy support to the Government, emergency management support to the peak Emergency Management body and overall management of the SES.
- 13 The need for strategic and policy support to Government be recognised by having sufficient resources within the Commission to support the State's emergency management functions – such as inter-agency, state and national initiatives. This unit



would provide the support needed to implement the outcomes of the current review of the State's disaster legislation and associated arrangements. These resources should be located in the Strategic Services Unit (as described in Recommendation 11).

- 14 An Operations Support Division be created and headed by a Director. The Director's responsibilities should include provision of specified support functions to MFS, CFS and SES, with formal accountabilities to those organisations and to the Commission. Some of the support functions could be performed from elsewhere in the Justice Portfolio.
- 15 The Director, Operations Support would be a non-voting member of the Commission.
- 16 In order to ensure proper linkages to the Justice Portfolio, a nominee of the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Justice be a non-voting member of the Commission.
- 17 The CFS Board to be restructured as the Country Fire and Rescue Board. It should focus on advising the Minister, CFS and SES on issues concerning public safety in regional areas, including volunteer issues, re-building local government involvement in the delivery of fire and rescue services and rationalisation of facilities where appropriate. The Board would advise the Chief Officer on fire prevention and fire suppression matters of a strategic or policy nature.

**The following recommendations are intended to support the main recommendation that the emergency services sector be re-structured. Whilst some of the recommendations can be adopted in isolation, the task force recommends that they be considered as part of a package.**

## **6.2 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS**

It is recommended that:

- 18 The Government clearly state its expectations (outcomes) of the emergency services sector.
- 19 The sector adopt the Commonwealth framework – Prevention, Preparedness, Response, Recovery.

## **6.3 RESOURCE ALLOCATION WITHIN THE SECTOR RECOMMENDATIONS**

It is recommended that:

- 20 The Minister for Emergency Services retain control of the allocation of funds through the Community Emergency Services Fund.
- 21 Funding bids from MFS, CFS, SES and other service providers be prioritised by SAFESC for consideration by the Minister.
- 22 Responsibility for administration of the Community Emergency Services Fund be transferred to SAFESC.

#### 6.4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

- 23 Discussions be undertaken with the Local Government Association to assess the feasibility of the LGA taking over collection of the property levy.
- 24 Savings be pursued through the use of local government resources in a range of activities, on a fee for service basis.

#### 6.5 EFFICIENCY AND SAVINGS RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

- 25 Opportunities for improved efficiency and savings be pursued in the following areas:
  - training - MFS and CFS each operate and maintain their own training facilities, causing duplication in administration, curriculum design, maintenance of standards and national accreditation as well as facilities costs
  - stations - in regional SA there are 43 instances of CFS and SES stations in the same vicinity and 10 instances of CFS, MFS and SES having stations within 10 kilometres of each other
  - accommodation - whilst there has been some rationalisation with ESAU, SES and CFS located in the one building, it must be asked whether they need to be in the CBD
  - shared services - whilst the task force has recommended that shared services be provided from within the Commission, there could be economies of scale if some of the shared services currently being provided by ESAU were to be provided by the Justice Portfolio shared service infrastructure
- 26 Opportunities for Commonwealth funding for appropriate emergency management activities be investigated and pursued.

**Conservatively the task force estimates savings of at least 2% (\$2.4m) per annum, in the third year of implementation.**

**Establishment of the Commission and an emergency management capability, plus implementation costs, will defer savings. The Commission should be allowed to redirect savings to meet emerging priorities, such as re-investing in emergency management infra-structure and activities, especially in regional areas where facilities, vehicles and equipment need attention.**

It is recommended that:

- 27 All savings in the first year after implementation of savings initiatives be re-invested in the sector.
- 28 Savings targets be set at 1% (\$1.2m) for the second year and a further 1% for the third year - bring the total savings target to \$2.4m.

#### 6.6 POST -IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS

- 29 The task force recommends that, within two years of implementation, the Minister review progress and performance.
-

## APPENDIX A TERMS OF REFERENCE

The following are the proposed Terms of Reference for the review, including the objective, strategy and process.

### **Objective**

To examine and identify improvements to the management, administration and governance arrangements of emergency services in relation to the following organizations:-

- Country Fire Service
- State Emergency Service
- South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service
- Emergency Services Administrative Units

South Australian Ambulance Service will not be included in this review.

### **Strategy**

The review will examine:

1. the extent to which the above-mentioned emergency services agencies are effectively meeting government policy and community expectations in relation to emergency services:

Note: The review will not deal with the adequacy of funding provided to the emergency services.

2. the suitability of the current governance arrangements; and
3. whether the administration and support provided to the agencies are consistent with best practice, avoid unnecessary duplication of services and are cost efficient and effective.

In particular the review will examine and report on:

- whether the key strategic priorities announced in October 1998 to achieve better public safety outcomes continue to be appropriate;
- the extent to which current governance arrangements (since the creation of ESAU) have met the above stated expectations; (including the role and function of the Emergency Services Leadership Group);
- the extent to which current governance arrangements and management have optimised efficiencies through a strategic approach to policy and service delivery across emergency services;
- the adequacy of current arrangements to meet the non-operational requirements of SAMFS, CFS and SES;
- recommendations for the enhancement of arrangements to improve efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery, including the most appropriate methods of resource allocation within the sector.

### **Review Report**

The review will result in a report to the Minister for Emergency Services through the Justice Portfolio Chief Executive.

**Consultation**

In conducting the review, consultation will be held with key stakeholders including the:

- Minister for Emergency Services
- Justice Portfolio Chief Executive
- Country Fire Service Board
- Relevant Unions including the Public Service Association and the United Firefighters Union
- Chief Officer of the South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service
- Chief Executive of the Country Fire Service
- State Director, State Emergency Services
- Chief Executive of the Emergency Services Administrative Unit
- Volunteer Fire Brigade Association
- SA SES Volunteer Association

The review will receive submissions from parties who may wish to present views on the subject matter of the review.

**Previous reviews and relevant documentation**

The review will examine any relevant documents including the Cabinet Submission *'Implementing an administrative unit for emergency services in South Australia'*, of 7 October 1998, the *Report on Post Implementation Review of Emergency Services Unit* of 20 November 2001 as well as relevant previous reviews of programs and operations of emergency services organizations as listed above.

**Alternative models for emergency services**

The review will also take account of models for the delivery of emergency services in the other states of Australia, in particular Queensland and Western Australia.

**Review arrangements**

It is proposed to employ a Taskforce comprised of the Hon. John Dawkins AO (Chairman), the Hon. Stephen Baker and Mr Richard McKay to undertake this review. This group was recently engaged to conduct the review of the Department of the Industry and Trade.

Messrs Dawkins, Baker and McKay have a very good understanding of the public sector and the issues facing all tiers of Government and their experience in this area is without equal. This includes the need to reduce duplication and inefficiency and identify financial savings that can be redirected to other government priorities.

**Submissions**

All submissions should be sent to:

- Emergency Services Review, GPO Box 464 Adelaide SA or Level 9, ING Building, 45 Pirie Street, Adelaide; or
- [esreview@agd.sa.gov.au](mailto:esreview@agd.sa.gov.au).

17 October 2002

## **APPENDIX B     PARTIES CONSULTED DURING THE EMERGENCY SERVICES REVIEW**

<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Name</b>
Emergency Services Administrative Unit	Barry Apsey, David Royle
Justice Portfolio	Kate Lennon, Simon Forrest, Kym Pennifold, Rex Mathews
Department of Premier and Cabinet	Suzanne Carman
State Emergency Service	Brian Lancaster, Nat Cooke
South Australian Parliament	Hon Robert Brokenshire, Hon Ian Gilfillan
Telstra	Kevin Newbold
Country Fire Service	Kim McHugh, Vince Monterola
Metropolitan Fire Service	Grant Lupton, Mick Smith, Tim MacIntosh
State Disaster Committee	Barry Grear
SES Volunteer Association	Derren Halleday, Trevor Arnold, Gavin Graetz
Local Government Association	John Comrie
Public Service Association	Rod Morrison, Kerrin Martin, Christine Koch, Brett Merritt
Volunteer Fire Brigades Association	Cam Stafford, Rick Elwood
Department of Environment and Heritage	Alan Holmes
United Firefighters Union	Mick Doyle
Department of Emergency Services, Queensland	Several executives and senior employees
United Firefighters Union, Queensland	Mark Walker
Former Chief Officer, MFS	Alan Bruce
Fire and Emergency Services Authority, Western Australia	Minister's Office, Chair of the Board, Chief Executive, several executives, representatives of Rural Fire Brigades and SES volunteers
United Firefighters Union, WA	Tony Drewett, John Walker
Review of SA's state disaster legislation and associated arrangements	Nicholas Newland
Department of Administrative and Information Services	Peter Fowler (Government Radio Network)
SA Police	Mal Hyde

**APPENDIX C      INVITATION FOR PUBLIC SUBMISSIONS****The Advertiser, 2 November 2002*****EMERGENCY SERVICES REVIEW*****Government  
of South Australia**

The South Australian Government has appointed a top level Task Force to examine and identify improvements to the management, administration and governance arrangements of emergency services in relation to the following organisations:

- Country Fire Service
- State Emergency Service
- South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service
- Emergency Services Administration Unit

The review will examine -

- the extent to which these agencies are effectively meeting government policy and community expectations in relation to emergency services;
- the suitability of the current governance arrangements; and
- whether the administration and support provided to the agencies are consistent with best practice, avoid unnecessary duplication of services and are cost efficient and effective.

Note: The review will not deal with the adequacy of funding provided to the emergency services.

The Taskforce members are the Hon John Dawkins AO (Chairman), the Hon Stephen Baker and Mr Richard McKay. They will report to the Minister for Emergency Services by January 2003.

A copy of the terms of reference is available by telephone call to 8204 9506 or by email request to [review@agd.sa.gov.au](mailto:review@agd.sa.gov.au).

Parties wishing to present views on the subject of this review are invited to send written submissions to:

Emergency Services Review  
Department of Justice  
GPO Box 464  
ADELAIDE SA 5000  
or via email to [review@agd.sa.gov.au](mailto:review@agd.sa.gov.au)

## APPENDIX D ALTERNATIVE MODELS

Members of the task force visited Queensland and Western Australia for discussions with senior executives, union and volunteer representatives and, in Western Australia, Ministerial advisors.

### **Similarities within the Queensland and Western Australian Models**

Both States have embarked upon significant legislative and reform processes that are designed to improved accountability and public safety. Some similarities exist in their approach:

- a broad view of emergency management has been adopted, consistent with the Commonwealth approach outlined later in this report;
- a single organisation is responsible both for emergency management and emergency response;
- the two fire services are retained as separate services, with their own specialist equipment, uniforms and culture - but under common management;
- in a deliberately gradual process, regional fire brigades and SES units are being amalgamated in small communities that cannot support separate volunteer services;
- one Chief Executive has responsibility for the provision of emergency services and Chief Officers have statutory responsibility for fire fighting operations;
- legislative change was essential in establishing the new arrangements;
- strong Ministerial support and astute choice of Chief Executive have been essential for success;
- corporate services and strategic support are provided centrally in an integrated form from within the organisation.

### **The Queensland Model**

The Queensland model has a Government department, with the Director-General responsible to the Minister.

Two advisory councils (Rural Fire Council and Emergency Services Advisory Council) support the Minister. The Fire and Rescue Service, a division of the department, contains the equivalent of MFS and CFS as two services, with greater cooperation. The Counter Disaster and Rescue Services Division of the department includes the equivalent of the SES as well as providing support on state and national issues. Other divisions exist for strategic/executive services and business support services.

The Department also supports the ambulance service and a very large volunteer base for emergency and marine rescue services. The total budget and size of the organisation are much larger than in South Australia.

### **Western Australian Model**

The Western Australian model has the Fire and Emergency Services Authority with a Board of Management. The Board reports to the Minister.

The Chief Executive is responsible to the Board, although most of the Board's powers have been delegated to the Chief Executive. The Fire Services Division comprises the urban operations and regional operations groups (equivalent to MFS and CFS), operating

separately but under common management structures and with opportunities for transfer between the two groups. SES is also a division. Small groups exist with responsibility for policy and strategic planning and emergency management. Training is provided from a single facility by the Human Resources Division. Other Divisions exist for business services and community safety. Extensive use has been made of consultative committee's.

FESA's size, budget and number of volunteers are similar to the emergency services sector in South Australia.



**APPENDIX E    EXPENSES AND PERSONNEL DATA****Expenses (excl GRN) & Capital Outlay****SA Country Fire Service**

	96/97	97/98	98/99	99/00	00/01	01/02
Expenses	15,276	15,612	14,440	21,458	26,040	30,497
Capital Outlay	1,161	1,996	1,333	7,744	8,373	7,599
Aggregate	16,437	17,608	15,773	29,202	34,413	38,096

**SA Metropolitan Fire Service**


	96/97	97/98	98/99	99/00	00/01	01/02
Expenses	60,031	56,614	56,574	60,487	66,116	66,756
Capital Outlay	3,295	1,785	5,284	3,777	2,665	5,125
Aggregate	63,326	58,399	61,858	64,264	68,781	71,881

**SA State Emergency Service**




	96/97	97/98	98/99	99/00	00/01	01/02
Expenses	1,984	2,453	2,668	4,220	5,520	6,662
Capital Outlay	4	27	193	3,057	1,497	1,645
Aggregate	1,988	2,480	2,861	7,277	7,017	8,307

**Total**

	96/97	97/98	98/99	99/00	00/01	01/02
Expenses	77,291	74,679	73,682	86,165	97,676	103,915
Capital Outlay	4,460	3,808	6,810	14,578	12,535	14,369
Aggregate	81,751	78,487	80,492	100,743	110,211	118,284



Expenses and Personnel Data



**FTE's SUMMARY AS AT 30th JUNE - 1999 TO 2002**

ESAU / SES      FTE's      Variance      Comments

Jun-97      21.3  
Jun-98      21.3      0.00  
Jun-99      20.6      -0.70  
Jun-00      113.7      Existing SES Staff + 83 MFS/CFS + 5 other staff + Volunteer Support  
Jun-01      136.8      23.10 # see below  
Jun-02      138.6      1.80 Includes FESSA from DAIS (6.0 fte), Excludes Office of Volunteers on temporary transfer (10.0 fte)

**MFS**

Jun-97      785.0  
Jun-98      790.0      5.00  
Jun-99      784.7      -5.30  
Jun-00      755.7      -29.00  
Jun-01      745.4      -10.30  
Jun-02      769.5      24.10

**CFS**


Jun-97      62.4  
Jun-98      79.0      16.60  
Jun-99      78.1      -0.90 est.  
Jun-00      45.0      -33.10  
Jun-01      68.8      23.80  
Jun-02      71.0      2.20

**TOTAL**

Jun-97      868.7  
Jun-98      890.3      21.60  
Jun-99      883.4      -6.90  
Jun-00      914.4      31.00  
Jun-01      951.0      36.60  
Jun-02      979.1      28.10

**# Explanation of 2001 additional employees**

Receptionist Level 6      1.0 Business case approved by ESOs  
OHS&W      0.4  
Business Officers      2.0 PwC Recommended / ESLG Approved  
Information Technology      4.0 ESLG Approved  
Project Management Office      5.0 ESLG Approved  
Youth Programs Officer - CFS      1.0  
Development Assessment      1.2  
Officers CFS  
Receptionist Brukunga\_CFS      1.0  
Principal Advisor Risk Mgt      1.0  
ASO - Stirling - CFS      1.0  
Regional Admin Officers SES      4.5  
Admin Assistant - CFS Gawler      1.0  
23.1




	ESAU/SES	MFS	CFS	TOTAL
Jun-97	21	785	62	869
Jun-98	21	790	79	890
Jun-99	21	785	78	883
Jun-00	114	756	45	914
Jun-01	137	745	69	951
Jun-02	139	770	71	979


# APPENDIX E

## Expenses and Personnel Data

Number of volunteers								
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002			
SES	5076	5391	5741	6210	6625			
CFS	17224	16915	17140	17069	16452			
MFS	195	207	207	207	207	(2000 to 2002 estimated)		



APPENDIX F CURRENT ORGANISATION STRUCTURE



**APPENDIX G      DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

<b>Title</b>	<b>Author/Source</b>
Post Implementation Review of Emergency Services Administrative Unit	Justice Portfolio, commissioned in 2001 by the then Minister for Emergency Services
Tulka Fire - Internal Audit of Mutual Aid	Government Investigations Unit, Crown Solicitor's Office
Report on Ash Wednesday Fires	The Volunteer, Vol 17
34th Report of the Public Accounts Committee on the Cost and Operations of the Country Fire Service	SA Parliament
Report of the Review Team on the South Australian Bushfires	WM Scriven, then Director Department of Lands, et al
Report of the Working Party on the South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service Country Brigades Staffing Strategy and Associated Standards of Fire Cover	Allan Bruce (previously Chief Officer MFS, et al
Report of the Select Committee on Bush Fire Protection and Suppression Measures	SA Parliament
Report of the Chief Officer South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service on Integration of the Fire Services of South Australia	Allan Bruce, former Chief Officer MFS
CFS Construction Cost Comparisons	GC Betros, commissioned by the Chief Executive, Department of Justice
Legal Bulletins and discussion papers	M Walter, Crown Solicitor and K Kelly, former Chief Counsel, Crown Solicitor's Office
Annual Reports 1996/97 to 2001/02	MFS, CFS, SES, ESAU
Government Boards and Committees	Department of Premier and Cabinet
Several documents	Department of Emergency Services, Queensland
Several documents	Fire and Emergency Services Authority, Western Australia
Several documents	Justice Portfolio
The Way Forward, and other reports	Roger Estall, former Chair of New Zealand Fire Service Commission
Productivity Commission Report on Government Services 2003	Productivity Commission
The Future of the Fire Service	Review of UK fire service
Volunteering in Emergency Services	Australian Journal of Emergency Management
Economic Costs of Natural Disasters	Bureau of Transport Economics
Benefits of Flood Mitigation	Bureau of Transport Economics
<i>Submissions to the task force</i>	11 submissions from the ESOs, ESAU, employee and volunteer representative organisations, CFS and SES groups, local government councils and private individuals

## APPENDIX H PROPOSED STRUCTURE

